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to his findings. The expert testimony gained may be of value in determining
the Industries in Indiana with the greatest silicosis hazard, as well as the
other occupational diseases present. However, different occupations in the
same industry have different degrees of exposure to the hazards of silicosis.
Studies of the dust concentration show a much higher exposure in certain
occupations constituting only a small part of the industry's total man-hours than
in other occupations having a close technological relationship. 8 8 Unless a
survey be made of each separate occupation under every possible condition
the usefulness of this provision will be slight in individual cases.
CoNcLusioN: The schedule of awards is similar in form to that of the
Workmen's Compensation Act and is not within the scope of this note. Most
variations are explained because of the difference in the nature of an occupational disease and an injury.8 9
The fear of loss of employment has caused labor groups in the dusty
industries to oppose compulsory periodic medical examinations. 4 0 The Indiana
act calls for medical examination only after disablement (§13) which is of
no value as a preventive measure. Periodic medical examinations are necessary to determine the effectiveness of the preventive practises of an industry but
it will not be a possibility until some form of security of employment is
offered along with it.41
Once a worker contracts silicosis there is no known cure; prevention remains the solution. The mechanical and engineering methods of prevention
42
are effective though distasteful to the workers and costly to the employers.
Affirmative public health acts requiring their use are a natural supplement to
the Occupational Diseases Act and would materially reduce silicosis in
industry.
B. W.
MORTGAGES-PLACE OF RacoRINc--Action to foreclose a mortgage. Defendant, a resident of Allen County, owned two grain elevators located respectively
on lands leased from the Baltimore and Ohio Ry. Co. and the Wabash R. Co.,
in DeKalb and LaGrange Counties. The leases' provided that the defendant

39 An inexplicable variation is the limitation of burial expense (sec. 7c) to
$100 in occupational diseases cases, while it is $150 in the Workmen's Compensation Act (sec. 39).
40Nelson, Silicosis Problem Solved in Visconsin (1936), 26 Am. Labor
Leg. Rev. 53, 57.
41 Sayers and Jones, op. cit. supra note 3, p. 27, "Preliminary and periodic
physical and roentgenological examination should be made of all employees
engaged in industrial processes where there is a potential if not actual exposure
to excessive concentrations of silica in the atmosphere."
42 Sayers and Jones, op. cit. supra note 3, p. 28-30. The use of methods
(1) to prevent the esape of the dust into the workroom atmosphere, (2) to
remove the dust from the atmosphere, and (3) the use of mechanical personal
protective equipment is advocated.
In Science News Letter, Mar. 18, 1939, Vol. 35, p. 163, is an account of the
use of aluminum dust inhalations as a preventive of silicosis. The aluminum
dust so inhaled dissolves in the body fluids to form colloidal aluminum hydroxide
which is then absorbed and firmly held on the silica crystals and renders the
dust harmless.
1 The language of the instrument quoted in the present case seemed to
indicate that one of the leases was only a license but the court in its treatment of the case considered both as leases. The writer in his discussion of
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had the right to remove such properties on the termination of the term. The
mortgage covered both the elevators and the leasehold interest. In executing
the mortgages, chattel mortgage forms were used; but contrary to the Chattel
2
Mortgage statute, they were recorded in the counties where the respective
properties were located. Subsequently, the properties were subleased to one
Levy, who claims priority over the mortgagees on the ground that the mortgages were improperly recorded. Held, that such properties do not constitute
"goods" under the Chattel Mortgage Act but are interests in land under the real
estate recording statute;3 therefore the mortgages were properly recorded.
Wayne v. Nathan (Ind. 1939), 19 N. E. (2d) 243.
Whenever it is doubtful what the exact nature of mortgaged property is,
realty or personalty, the question of where to record the mortgage instrument
is of considerable importance. The significance of this event arises out of the
fact that if the instrument is improperly recorded it does not constitute con4
structive notice to third persons, thereby offering only limited protection to
the holders of the improperly recorded instrument. The instant case raises the
question of the appropriate treatment of fixtures annexed to a leasehold by a
lessee. Are they to be recorded (under the Chattel Mortgage Act) in the
county where the mortgagor resides, or (under the statute relevant to mortgages on real property) in the county where the properties are situated?
A general definition of goods includes all chattels personal other than things
5
in action and money while the phrase "any interest in realty" has been
interpreted to mean all property properly classified as real estate and all
other interests connected thereto, including fixtures and chattels real. Elevators
and structures appurtenant thereto, like those involved in the present case,
would be classified ordinarily as fixtures and regarded as part of the land if
erected by a landowner on his own realty.6
However, where property is placed upon the premises by a tenant, conthe case has followed the interpretation of the court due to lack of sufficient
data on this point.
2 Burns' Ind. Stat. (1933), 33-301. "No assignment of goods by way of
mortgage shall be valid against any other person than the parties thereto,
where such goods are not delivered to the mortgagee or assignee and retained
by him, unless such assignment or mortgage shall be acknowledged as provided
in case of deeds of conveyance and recorded in the recorder's office of the
county where the mortgagor resides, if he resided in this state, and if not
a resident of the state, then in the county where said property is situated within
ten days after the execution thereof." This provision has since been modified
by Burns' Ind. Stat. (1933 Supp.) § 51-501, § 51-504, § 51-509.
3Burns' Ind. Stat. (1933), § 56-119. "Every conveyance or mortgage of
lands or of any interest therein, and every lease for more than three years
shall be recorded in the recorder's office of the county where such lands shall
be situated and every conveyance, mortgage or lease shall take priority according to the time of the filing thereof, and such conveyance, mortgage or lease
shall be fraudulent and void as against any subsequent purchaser, lessee, or
mortgage in good faith and for a valuable consideration, having his deed,
mortgage, or lease first recorded.
4 Jones, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales, Vol. I, Sec. 250, p. 426.
5 Willard v. Hegdon (1914), 123 Md. 447, 91 A. 577, Ann. Cas. 1916 C 339.
6Tiffany, The Law of Real Property (1920), Vol. I, p. 903; Teaff v.
Hewitt (1853), 1 Ohio St. 511, 530; Wheting v. Lubec (1922), 121 Me. 121,
115 A 896.
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stituting trade fixtures, 7 the character of the property is more difficult to determine. "On this point there has been much confusion, the courts having held that
trade fixtures are not for all purposes, personal property, or real property,
but that they constitute a twilight zone of rights in which both types intermingle, the rights of one type being emphasized for some purposes and the
rights of the other type for other purposes." 8 For example, for execution purposes by a creditor of the lessee they are treated as chattels 9 while for purposes of a mortgage by the lessee of his interest they are treated as realty.10
It is submitted that in light of these decisions that the classification of a
trade fixture is a nebulous one depending largely on the policy which the
courts wish to uphold and the particular factual setup involved. A good
example is the instant case, which is complicated by the additional factor that
the leaseholds were mortgaged together with the fixtures, injecting a new
element into the typical case. The courts in such instances have held that
policy would seem to dictate that the property should be considered as an
interest in realty until severed, rather than personalty.ll
Another element relevant to the determination of the present problem is
the treatment of the chattel real under the recording laws. This classification,
including all interests in real estate less than a freehold, was regarded by the
common law as personalty for many purposes.1 2 However, under the broad
definition of the real estate recording law which includes "every conveyance
or mortgage of any interest in lands", 1 3 chattels real have uniformly been held
recordable under the real estate statute. Thus where, as in the present case,
a leasehold is involved, it is often held that buildings and machines annexed
by a tenant follow the term and partake of its character.1 4
On the application of the above reasons to the instant problem, it is easily
discernable that the property constitutes an interest in land under the recording laws, and that the recordation in the county where the lands lay was valid.
It is submitted that although the case as decided may not be entirely in
harmony with the Indiana decisions, 1 5 the result reached is a desirable one
and is in accord with the better authority.16
F. L. M.
7 The properties in the instant case constitute trade fixtures since they were
used for trade purposes. Brown, On Personal Property, p. 655; Van Ness v.
Pacard (1829), 2 Pet. (U. S.) 137.
8 Brown, On Personal Property, pp. 659, 661.
9 Freeman v. Dawson (1883), 110 U. S. 264-, 4 S. Ct. 94.
10 San Francisco Breweries v. Schultz (1894), 104 Cal. 420, 38 Pac. 92.
11 San Francisco Breweries v. Schultz (1894), 104 Cal. 420, 38 Pac. 92:
First Nat'l Bank of Joliet v. Adams (1891), 138 Ill. 483, 28 N. E. 955; Meux v.
Jacobs (1875), L. R. 7H. L. 481.
1222 R. C. L. 65: Hyatt v. Vincennes Nat'l Bank (1884), 113 U. S. 408, 5
S. Ct. 573; Newhoff v. Mays (1891), 48 N. J. Eq. 619, 23A. 265.
18
Burns' Ind. Stat. (1933) § 56-119.
14 Hyatt v. Vincennes Nat'l Bank (1884), 113 U. S. 408, 5 S. Ct. 573. The
above statement is true even when the tenant makes an agreement with the
landlord that he may remove such property after the termination of the lease.
15 Merril v. Garner (1913), 54 Ind. App. 514, 101 N. E. 152; Central Trust
and Savings Co. v. Wallace (1918), 66 Ind. App. 629, 118 N. E. 593; Perry
v. Acme Oil Co. (1909), 44 Ind. App. 207, 88 N. E. 859; St. Joseph Hyraulic
Co. v. Wilson (1893), 133 Ind. 465, 33 N. E. 113 These cases, however, may be
distinguished from the present case in as much as they were only concerned
with the character of the fixtures alone while in the case at bar the mortgage
concerned both the leasehold interests and the fixtures. 22 R. C. L. 65.
10 Tiffany, On Real Property (1920), Vol. I, p. 932; Freeman v. Dawson
(1883), 110 U. S. 270, 4 S. Ct. 94.

